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T NTROI) UCT t ON
The research described in this paper grew out of .qollleof the c_,il<,ern:;
expressed by airline pilots during the preliminary pilot interview _;tt:d[_,_:
mentioned in tile previous paper (ref. i). Specifically many pilot.,._felt
that the approach procedures they were using were less than ,,ptima] v'itl_
regard to two major items: (a) the integration of a11 three cockl) It cri,v_-
members into the approach procedure; and (b) the callouts required oF it,.
various crewmembers during an approach.
The critical demands placed upon pilots during the last one ,:,i: t_,,, huudr,.d
feet of an approach are well known. Mmiy accidents have occurred dui'in)!, tilt:-:
critical phase of flight, and in many o17 these it appears that one .,f el,v, .n:ll.,r
contributing factors was the inadequate or inappropriate design .,f ;lppt-'o;icli
procedures, including crew integration and ca!louts. In 10arty c;mes .<mffici_,.t
information to prevent the impending disaster was present withtn the r',,cl'.l,lt,
yet the crew failed to utili_e this information. Once the fly|ng pllol ll;_:'
changed to flight by visual reference, deviations from the desired I-l:l!:..llt p'lllt
' might not be readily discernible fronl outside v]su_tl cues. ThI-,,.It, dl,vi,i1 t_ui,.
wtl.1, however, invariably show till on tile cm'kplt [llStl-lml{,;ll-;il I,n, I lli,r,,:,::,,,l
sink rate, deviations below 141tde slope, or low airspeed all Hl,-t,;il I.,,I
killer Items--will. be displayed tnslde the cockpit. It Is llt,ct, s;i:lfX ltl;il t!li_:
information be transferred to the flytnv pilot tl _lll ;lccldent i.'; I,, 1,,.
prevented.
There are two ways of performing; tlit,_ t:l,<,'k: (;I) tll,, l,lly:-:i,'<,l ,,,_,,i,,,,,,,,,,i
can be modi[led_ making the information ;ivallablt, [n tlic. pil_,l_t:; vi_:ll,_l l i, 1,1
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_._';': vla the uao _ll V_SI. or a liuad_lJp dlsp]ay, f.r example; or, (b) tim opurat:.onal
_-/i$, envlr,mmont can b,, modified by ut-_lnp, auto]and or by tlm adoption of now call.-
--..--_, oUtPJ ;|nd moni tot ].llj_ pr_,cedurea,
Y-I
_": Figure ] l l,]ut,ltl','ltos Lilt, rulatl, ont-flilp bet.wuon tim present expor:lment and
----'-:,, tnu c,pidomlo,logical model doscrlbud in tl., pruvloua Impor by Bl.llingv_ et al,.
_: (rof. 1). The primary Interest wm_ In the efforts of man lpulation of the
operat 1onal env I ronm,,nt, tqme I f I t'a ] l y .Iow v[ q 11)I ] 1 ty apl_roach procedures, upon
Ii [rcrow /llld a I rcraft porf{_rlll;lll_,(.,.
Al.thoul.l_ apl}r(,ach I_roredur(m used by alr]:lnes vary widely, it is possible --"
to discern two Imslc i)hilostq3h:l.es which have been used to structure these pro-
cedures. ()ne of these, the standard procedure, Is has'Ieally this: one pilot
is responsible for fly_ny the approach and landing, or missed approach if that
should be necessary, and the other crewmembers are assigned monitoring and
col]out duties. The decision to land or to go around is made by the flying
pilot on the basis of his assessment of the v:Isual situation following the
transition from heads-down flying. Varlat[ons of thls basic procedure are
used by virtually all U.S. air carriers.
One alternative to the standard procedure is one called the monitored
approach by several of the foreign carriers who have developed these tech-
niques. Basically, using this procedure, one pilot, usually the copilot, is
responsible for flvlng the heads-do_1 portion of the approach; the other
pilot is responsible for monitoring this portion o5 the approach and is the
individual who decides whether the outside visual cues are sufficient for the
landlng. If they are, this p_Iot, who is usually the captain, takes physical
centrol of the tvlrcraft and proceeds with the landing. At the transition,
the copilot as qumes responsibility for monitoring the remainder of the approach
and landtng, remaining head down until sometime during the landing roll.
Intuitively, this monitored approach proredure has some appealing fea-
tures, particularly in the way the transition from instrument reference to
visual reference flight is made. The captain is given sufficient time to
assess the v[suql situation and reach a decision and can do so without the
additlon;11 burd_,n of flyln£ the aircraft. Furthermore, more emphasis is placed
upon continuous monitoring of the critical final portion of the approach and
landing, llowever, there are also some characterLstlcs of this procedure which
appear to be less desirable, particularly those having to do with the physical
transfer of aircraft control at very low altitudes.
In attempting to resolv(' these and other i,'mues, It ,,-oonbecame apparent
that there l,q little, if any, objective data perta[ning to the relative effec-
• tiveness of these two basic philosophie.u for (.onductlng low visibility
approaclles. On the basis of the accumulated operational experience of those
carriers who have used the monitored procedure, it can be concluded that the
idea has considerable merit, llowever, bf_cause of the fundamental importance
of approach prnc_,dure,,_ for the safety of aircraft operations, decisions to
utilize this ;q)proach, or any other fc, r that m;_tter, should he based on more
t
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Devolopment of' Approach Procedures
Because the carrier who participated In the study used a variant of the
standard procedure, it was necessary to develop a modified standard l_rm'edure
i: in order to control for the possible effects of crew familiarity with the
standard procedure. To accomplish this, the approach procedures and eallouts
used by another U.S. carrier were used. This set of procedures was suffi-
ciently different from those used by tile participating carrier, that the
likelihood that familiarity influenced the results of this study is minimal.
This set of procedures is summarized in figure 2.
Two major criteria were used during the development of the monitored
procedure which was used in this experiment: (a) the flight engineer should
be fully and completely integrated into tile approach procedure; and,
(b) there should always be a el.ear-cut division of responsibilities --
pilot flying, primary monitor, and backup monitor- as shown in figure 3.
In other words, at any given point during an approach, each crewmember
should be assigned one of these three functions, and whenever there ks a
change in one crewmember's function, there should be a corresponding, com-
pensatory change in another ere_number's function. Thus, for example, when
the flight engineer calls out, "Approacldng rain!taurus," tile captain verbally
acknowledges this callout and changes to outside visual, reference. Slmu]-
taneously, the flight engineer assumes the primary monltorinK duties inside
the cockpit, and the first off leer continues to function as the flying pilot.
When the captain announces, "l.and," tlm first officer now assumes primary
monitor duties, tile flight engineer resumes his role of back-up monitor, and
of course, the eaptain becomes tim pilot l'lyin_,.
Cailouts were constructed with regard to the three malor Iuneti_ms which
:..[ callouts can perfot_n: (a) they serve to tran.,m_it information abrupt the stat_'
Ii of the aircraft; (b) tlley serve to cheek for subtle pilot ineapacil;It Itm --- if
a pilot misses a callout, or fails t_ acknowledge one, pil,,ts
tile oth__,r ,,-;hlul ] ,I
:' check to make sure the quiet one Is still with them; ;rod flnatlv, (c) ca[lout,_;
can be used to help enf_rce heads-dm¢n disclpl.ine. II: we want to m;tximizt, tl_t,
' probability that a pilot will r_,lilaln ,ul the instruments durinK th,, la,_I ,_I,'I)'.eH
t of an approach, we Cglll ;I,4,_;|}_,11 h[lll sp,.cltle c;tll_mt dul [c,:-: dtll'[ll}" tl_:H, p¢,ri,,,t
-: : of time.
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MI,_+m,d +_ppro+lche_ were ll(ItOlllltti[C; if tile captain had not taken control of
tht, ;tlrer;irt wht,n it ro_lcil_,d the missed _lpproach point, th¢2 first critter
ln lll;tl..d tl.:, l, lstsod _ll_pr,):lt:]l procedurt,, and tile captain came back inslde the
t,nJ'l<pll Ic_ ros.mt, tilt, role of primary monitor. If it became necest_ary to go
;tmumd ,*llt_,r the eaptztt.n had decided to ]and, the captain called out, "Missed
+ll.prt_;/<'ll," zllld tzhe first officer resumed control of the aircraft and announced.
"1 IDav_, thp airplane." This procedure was chosen because it was reasoned that
I-h<, I"IF_;| _f'l+l.eer, hel+ng continu,msly heads down, was ]n the best position to
;l:qt;ume r;tpld ;tlld prL, cisc, control, oF the a'ireraft.
l.'Jgure4 shows the work sheet which was provided to the flight engineer ,.
whun using the monitored procedure. Before each approach was begun, the
Flight: unglneer was given an approach plate by the pilot so that he could
de,termlne th_ information shown on the worksheet. This information was used
subsequuntly by the flight engineer for cross checking and for callouts. In
addition, the flight engineer was assigned very specific me;litoring duties and
guidellm_s for calling out deviations from the desired flight profile.
Subjects
Because the study involved training airline pilot subjects on the use of
an appcoach procedure which was not the approved procedure used by their
company, training pilots, rather than line pilots, were used for this experi-
ment. It was felt unwise to _isk the possibility of training someone to the
point _here, if he were by chance to fly an actual low visibility approach
shortly after his participation in this study, he might revert to the experi-
mental procedures rather than use the approved procedure.
Eight current instructor pilots and four current flight engineer instruc-
tors served as subjects for this experiment. These instructors were assigned
to one of four crews. The flight experience of each of the subject pilots is
summarized in table I.
Simulation Facilities
The simulator used for this experiment was a DC-10 simulator equipped
with a slx-degree-of-freedom motion platform and a TV, model-terrain-
board visual system. Modifications were made to the simulation software to
allow control of the experimental conditions from the instructor's CRT display
and control panel located in the cockpit, and to allow real-time recording of
s:Imulator data on digital magnetic tape. Additionally, provisions were made
for recording communications, cockpit voice, and observer comments. Experi-
m_ntal sessions, each four hours long, were Inte_ ted into the normal simu-
lator training schedule.
Simulator Scenarios and Experimental Design
Since one of the primary areas of concern with the monitored procedure
cpnters around the question of transfer of control of the aircraft at low
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altltud.H, only h;md-flt_wn appro,'tehc, s were used, Autopllot use and Its
fnteraetIc,1 wlt.h ;ll_pro;Icll pro,:,,dures ls :1 separate:, tluestJ.on wh,(ch was floe
,Mdroz_m,d Ill tlli_ :;tudy.
l'ossIbIt, lutoraetlolls botwet,n the k lad of ;ippro;lc'h and tile approach pro-
cedure_ weft, :11:_o o1" Ir_tert, st, 'Phorefore t,oth non-directlona] t)e_lccm (NI)13)
and Im_trumenl..landing; system (ll,S) ;lppronches wore flown, All "S al)pro;whes
wert, I']t)wn I),_tzlg tile F llgl)t Director _))ld manual throttles, A_I NJ. approaches
were f]OWll lls[n_;r;lWdo£_l Oll]y.
Each crew l:Ivwa totol of 32 approaches during the data collection phase -_'
of th,'experimeut, sixteen usinF, the monitored approach procedure, and sixteen
usillb', the staDdal:d procedure.
Since one of the characteristt.cs of a good set of approach procedures is
to better etlable crews to cope w{th difficult operational situations, the
effects of a variable called "Stress and Workload" on crew performance were
evaluated. To accomplish this, radar vectoring techniques, wind shear, and
turbulence were used to generate high and low stress and workload condltions.
:: The low workload condition involved no turbulence, no wind shear, a five-knot
crosswind from either the right or left, and radar vectoring service that was
nearly ideal-- timely, accurate, and such that the aircraft would intercept
the final approach course well outside the final approach fix at the proper
altitude and airspeed. In contrast, the high workload condition involved a
forty-knot head or tail wind which sheared to a direct crosswind of ten knots
by 61 m (200 ft) above ground level (AGL), some turbulence, and radar vector-
ing of the kind too often encountered in the real world- late descent clear-
ances, late turn-ons, and delayed speed reductions. These vectoring scenarios
were chosen such that, ii: flown preclsely, the aircraft would intercept the
glide slope and final approach course right at the final approach fix (FAF)
for the ILS approaches, and 1.6 km (i mi) outside the final approach fix for the
NDB approaches. These were difficult scenarios to fly, and they were chosen
deliberately because instructor pilots are extremely proficient simulator
pilots and it was necessary to ensure that there was ample opportunity for
deviations from prafi.le to develop.
Each approach (as shown in fig. 5) was begun from identical conditions:
downwind heading, 1342 m (5000 ft) AGL, 250 knots, and with the aircraft in a
clean conf_};urnt:ion from a position 16 km (i0 mi) abeam (either right or left)
of the final approam, fix. After a preliminary briefing during which the
approach l,_cati,m :rod type were specified, the simulator was released, and
the Experiment Controller, :lqual{fied DO-.-10instructor pilot who worked with
:" us for the du,'at[on ,_f the study, proceeded to give radar vectors according
to the l_reselccted scenario. ,qtandard company operating procedures, Includin_
checkiists, wt, rc; used l,_v all npl)roaches,
An approach was terminated during the 1.anding rollout, or upon r.,.'_chfng
150 m (%rio ft) ACI, during tl,v missed apl_roach. For half of the n:proac'hes,
the simulated vlstbtlitv wa:: set to zero (below minimums). Fo" the remaining
half, the vi:_ibilttv wn,4 sel ;It the appropriate minimums for t.lte approach
type, Daylight conditions were, simulated in all circumsl',_r, ces.
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!. Two crews flew the monitorvd approach proe_:duren first, fol]owod hy t'ht,
' standard procedure. The order was reversed for the rematnlng two or,.w_.
i Data collection was proceeded by a 2-hr ground school _otmlon durlnl,
,i_: which two crews were briefed regarding the approach proceduro/_ they wore ab,,utJ
• _': to fly. Following ground school, the pilots were given a 1-hr, 15-mln nlm.-
i ," later training session during which 4 ILS and 4 NDB approaches wore flown
:=::i utilizing the appropriate set of procedures. The entire sequence of proun,l
i.;.. school, simulator training, and data collection was re.peatc:dl'or th,_ alt'ernatt,
: set of approach procedures. Upon completion of tilelast data co].leeth,n run,
i_[ an extensive debriefing session was held during which comments, obserwltt.on,,-_, ""
" and suggestions of the pilots were sot'zht.
',_ RESULTS
i' For the purposes of analyzing the tracking data recorded during thls
i_ study, each approach is arbitrarily divided into two segments. The Inltia]
!: approach segment is that portion of the approach between the Final Approach
Fix and a point 10 sec prior to reaching the missed approach point. The
iill remainder of an approach to a landing is termed the final approach segment.
Landings and missed approaches were analyzed separately from the initial
approach data. This division was necessary to enable the analysis to foe,m
clearly upon the critical last i00 m of an approach. For all practical pur-
poses, there is little difference between the two kinds of approach procedures
prior to the missed approach point. It is at the point where the eor:trol of
the aircraft is transferred from one pilot to the other that major differences
would be most likely to appear. ILS and NDB approaches were analyzed sepa-
rately.
Initial Approach Segment
Tracking data were transformed into rms lateral error, rms glide-slope
error, and airspeed variability measures, and were subjected to an Analysi._
of Variance. As expected, the stress and workload variable did significantly
affect airspeed, localizer and glide-slope tracking for the ILS approaches,
and lateral course error and airspeed control for the NDB approaches. No
_" other factor, including the set of approach procedures used, produced any
significant differences in aircraft performance.
• Final Segment
One measure, lateral error during NDB approaches, was slgnifleantly dif-
ii ferent as a function of approa h procedure - lateral tracking was more variabl_,
using the monitored procedure. This was one of only two Instance_ whet,, the
.i.,I approach procedure variable resulted in a significant dtfferem'v in pvrf,_rm:lne_,.
t
d.
ii. :
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l,andlng Data
Landlngt; wt,re analyzed using lateral and longitudinal error and sink rate
at touchdown as meanure/_ of landing performance. There wore no significant
differences observed for any landing measures.
MisAed Approneh Data
Missed approach performance was evaluated using peak deviation below
_)A/DH (where _)A is minimum descent altitude and DH is decision height), and "
the square of peak deviation to give emphasis to the larger and presumably more
dangerous deviations. In addition, the time integral of total flight path below
MDA/DH was analyzed. The average peak deviation below b_)A for NDB approaches
was significantly larger using the monitored approach procedure. No other
significant differences were observed.
Debriefing Interview Results
Pilot reaction during the training sessions to the monitored procedure
was largely negative, and virtually all subjects expressed concern about the
transfer of control of the aircraft. These negative attitudes were modified
after the subjects had experience with the experimental set of procedures;
however, it is still necessary to characterize the prevailing attitude as
"concerned." Most pilots, however, did concede that there were some positive
benefits to using the experimental procedure, particularly in reference to
the increased monitoring d£seipllne achieved with this procedure.
There was universal acclaim from the subjects for the increased emphasis
on involving the flight engineer in the approach. It was the concensus that
this one aspect of the experimental procedure was by far the most important
and valuable.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In some ways the lack of major significant difference between the two
procedures was a disappointing outcome. However, in retrospect, there are
some encouraging aspects as well.
Flrst, with respect to the question of the superiority of one set of pro-
cedures over another, it is necessary to conclude on the bas_s of results
• obtained hurt, that crews can perform equally well using either set of proce-
dures. There is no clear-cut reason to select one set of procedures over
another on tilebasis of system performance measures used in this experiment.
Put another way, the choice of which of the basic approach procedures to be
used should be based upon other factors. Particularly Important here is the
accumulated experience of a company with one set of procedures; the difficul-
ties encountered In changlnp, from one set of l)rocedures to anotl,er may far
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outweigh the potontial advantago_ obtained by adopting an alternate not of
procedures,
Another conclusion ts that rc, gardless of which basic approach procedure
is used, it Is important that the flty, ht era;inter be. fully _ntegrated _nto tile
approach, The col.louts mid monitoring duties wlM.eh were nsstgnod the flight
engineer are ]ar$;ely indep¢,ndent of the approach procedure adoptc,d, Although
not directly supported by the tracking data obtained in this study, there Is
little doubt that th_s :Is the most Important sing].e eonstderation in tilt,
development of low v_stl_:L1Lty approach procedures. ..,
And finally, we can conclude that simulator evaluations of approach proce-
dures are feasible.
In summary, this first experiment was a preliminary attempt to assess the
effects of selected operational factors on pilot performance, in this case
with largely negative results. In a qecond study, the experience accumulated
during this first study was used to refine procedures and techniques in an
attempt to understand how certain perturbations in the operational environment
can affect atrcrew behavior, The preliminary results are highly encouraging,
and it is intended to pursue the leads generated by those data in an attempt
to see if techniques can be developed which will help airline pilots to cope
with such disturbances.
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!TABLE I.- PILOT DATA
b:
_". CREW SUBJECT TOTAL TI ME DC-10
_i 1 9000 hr 600 hrs
=,;i A 2 14000 400
: 3 1500 400
_, im
_f: 4 14000 400
_"_;!i B 5 13000 4006 6000 700
.I: 7 9000 600
i C 8 11000 400
_t: 9 15000 300?-
_t: 10 7600 500
D 11 6000 500
12 6900 (2.5 yr )
Ill
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CAPTAIN
FIRST OFFICER Vr_/_-.-u/[fT///1/[/-#/,,//y//[/Tn77n[Hi//i/_.H]//J)i1_,
SECOND OFFICER lrll-i"Trll i iii I ] i ] l l;l i i iHl] i I'l l[ 1 ll l] in ].]111 =ii [1Tl 111! 111[ 11_ElIll
PILOT FLYING
PRIMARY MONITOR f.Z__Z(J_.ZZZ_
BACKUPMONITOR
i _:r r -
FINAL APPROACHFIX CALLOUTS: "100 feet °MINIMUMS"ABOVE..."
Figure 2.- Standard approach procedure.
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SECONDOFFICER li_£Ul iJiJ ii i; i r.;,i _.=.,.,J, i,_li,, I_,1ijlrj. L.._./'//L,,JI1ii IJ i Illl ii tl i llil
PILOT FLYING
PRIMARY MONITOR
BACKUPMONITOR
I I t ".,.
I t I "-
I I
FINAL AtiPROACH FIX CALLOUTS: "100 foot "MINIMUMS"ABOVE..."
Figure 3.- blonitorcd approuch proct,durc.
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Figure 5.- Approach profile.
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